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1. Introduction
   There is much talk about "organized crime". Often the image is of a 
tightly knit international cabal. Criminologists don't find much evidence 
for this. For that matter, with few exceptions, throughout this century nei-
ther the FBI nor the RCMP have found much evidence for such a 
conceptualization of "organized crime." Rather, the evidence would sug-
gest, in the words of Brodeur (1996), that it would be more accurate to 
speak of associations of criminals organizing crime, rather than of orga-
nized crime associations. 
   It is important to be precise about what is being targeted if our strate-
gies are going to be effective in controlling crime. Consequently, the first 
object of this paper is to examine the phrase, "organized crime". Thereafter, 
some of the major criminal activities perpetrated by associations of crimi-
nals in Canada will be examined. Next, various clusters of associations of
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criminals classified by Criminal Intelligence Service Canada will be identi-
fied. Following that will be a presentation of relevant recent legislation, 
related judicial decisions and legislative responses thereto, pending legisla-
tion, additional concerns of the law enforcement community, and a recount-
ing of what Canada has been doing to contain enterprise crime and illicit 
substance distribution. In closing, some critical questions will be raised. 
                 2. In Search of Substance
   If we are to devise effective strategies for combatting organized crime, 
we should be precise about whom and what we are seeking to target. Defi-
nitions of organized crime are too often merely stereotypical descriptions 
or vague assertions. Definitions often either are not fully inclusive of what 
we think of as organized crime or they do include other crimes that are not 
what most people consider to be "organized crime". That is, as Brodeur 
(1996) commented in a major presentation at a National Forum on orga-
nized Crime in Canada's capital in September, 1996, we should be careful 
to distinguish between unlawful activities that are essentially organized crime 
and criminal activities that happen to be prosecuted under laws that are 
heralded as laws targeting organized crime. 
   For example, the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada [CISC] (1996C) 
cites the RCMP's Criminal Intelligence Directorate's list of characteristics 
that differentiate organized crime from other crime. These are: corruption 
for gain or resulting from blackmail; discipline, including threatened or 
actual violence to enforce obedience; infiltration of legitimate institutions; 
insulation of the criminal organization's leaders; a monopoly over activi-
ties within a geographic area (which does not preclude collusive agreements 
motivated by profit); motivation to obtain wealth or byproducts of wealth 
such as power and influence; subversion of society's legal or moral values; 
a history allowing entrenchment and refinement of criminal activities; the 
use of violence; sophistication in the use of advanced systems of commu-
nication and asset management, as well as entry into political, judicial, and 
enforcement circles; continuity of profitable criminal enterprises; diver-
sity of activities engaged in for profit and control; bonding of individuals 
to one another and of individuals to the group, and mobility across any type 
of boundary. 
   If the above descriptive characteristics are accepted as common to all 
organized crime, then Canada does not have legislation that is specifically 
targeted at organized crime. Rather, Canada's Proceeds of Crime legisla-
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 tion is a very imprecise instrument that targets a wide range of criminal 
activities that do not fit CISC's portrayal of the RCMP's characterization of 
"organized crime ." Brodeur (1996:32) cites evidence that excessively broad 
legislation has exposed the fight against organized crime in the U.S. to the 
risk of a counter-productive public backlash . 
    Brodeur accepts that some criminal groups filling the characteristics 
of organized crime described by CISC may exist . However, he argues that a 
wide variety of traditional and newer criminal activities are engaged in by a 
diversity of organizations which often are ad hoc in nature —and constantly 
on the verge of internal conflict leading to collapse . As well, he differenti-
ates between unlawful activities that are inherently "organized crime" and 
those criminal activities that may merely be captured as "organized crime" 
under various laws. 
    Brodeur also takes pains to point out that a notion of organized crime 
groups operating in isolation from the rest of society is inaccurate. Rather 
he sees significant relationships between criminal organizations and con -
ventional society. Brodeur prefers the concept of "organizing crime" to that 
of "organized crime." His reasons for this are that he sees typical criminal 
enterprises as much more fluid than bureaucratic , constantly evolving and 
adapting, and organizing not only their own activities but also those of oth-
ers through alliances and networks . 
   Naylor (1996), who presented another major paper at the Canadian 
National Forum on Organized Crime, identifies a succinct list of assumed 
characteristics of organized crime to scrutinize for empirical validity . These 
are a durable hierarchy; a stress on enterprise offences; the use of vio-
lence and corruption; the achievement of very high rates of return; and 
the penetration of legitimate business. 
   However, Naylor (1996) does not find this model to be empirically 
verified. Rather, he sees criminals as engaging in actual crimes either as 
individuals or in small partnerships. Like Brodeur , he suggests that it would 
be more accurate to conceptualize the issue as associations of criminals 
rather than as criminal associations. This view is very similar to that put 
forth by Brodeur. 
   CISC, Brodeur, and Naylor all agree that there are many linkages of 
criminal organizations with legitimate institutions , though there is some 
disagreement about the reasons for, and the nature of , these relationships. 
Beare (1996) also is struck by the integration of many criminal organiza-
tions with conventional society, as indicated by her two-dimensional clas-
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sification of such organizations. One of her dimensions is the apparent le-
gitimacy or illegitimacy of the enterprise, while the other classifies whether 
the activity is predatory towards or symbiotic with the larger society. 
3. Organized Criminal Activities 
   Nobody knows with any certainty how much of any type of organized 
criminal activity takes place. Surveying and analysing estimates of orga-
nized crime's revenues and profits for the United States, Naylor (1996) 
infers that the amount of profit involved in organized crime is often wildly 
exaggerated. Be that as it may, the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada 
(1996C) estimates annual revenues of at least C$20 billion for organized 
crime, about half of it from the drug trade. While any such estimate is no 
more than an educated guess, one can conclude with confidence that enter-
prising associations of criminals will respond to any lucrative opportunity 
that arises. 
   Naylor observes that such opportunities, historically, have been entre-
preneurial in the sense of providing a good or service that was not other-
wise being provided (or, perhaps, which was not being provided predict-
ably or at a sufficient level of customer satisfaction). Naturally, most such 
goods and services were illegal and involved contraband goods or outlawed 
services. 
    In a sense criminal entrepreneurs filled a void in a marketplace that 
was created by governments. By outlawing various goods and services, 
governments minimized competition and ensured a high mark-up for those 
who provided them (to offset extraordinary overheads in the form of bribes, 
hired violence, laundering costs, and sundry other risks involved for whom-
ever provided such goods and services). 
    Gambling activities and the sex trade were among the leading services 
traditionally provided by organized criminal groups, as was the provision 
of alcohol during the prohibition years. Today, the unlawful trade in vari-
ous drugs is thought to be the most lucrative organized criminal activity 
within Canada. Of course, criminal groups continue to be active in the sex 
trade and illegal gambling —as well as legal gambling for money launder-
ing purposes. Illegal gambling using video lottery terminals (VLTs) made 
possible by new technologies is particularly troublesome in the provinces 
of Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec (CLEU Policy Analysis, 1995B) 
    There has been a significant revival in the smuggling of contraband 
tobacco and alcohol. However, recent smuggling has been motivated by the
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 evasion of high levels of taxation rather than by the legal unavail
ability of 
 the product  —as was the case when prohibition existed in various 
parts of  Canada and all of the United States . Smuggling networks are also traffick -
 ing in both firearms and illegal migrants . Additionally, there is apprehen-
 sion about possible smuggling of plutonium and other nuclear materials for 
 terrorist activities . 
    As well as expanding the scope of goods (and people) that sm uggling 
 networks bring into Canada , such networks have facilitated smuggling sto-
 len luxury automobiles and other luxury goods out of Canada for resale .  Th
e Insurance Office of Canada estimates losses from unretrieved stolen 
 vehicles at C$293 million per year . The majority of these are stolen from 
 the province of Quebec and are tied to the export of stolen auto s overseas in 
 export containers. 
    In addition to automobile thefts for export , a variety of other profit-
 motivated automobile thefts occur . For example, "chop shops" strip parts 
from late model stolen automobiles to upgrade older automobil
es, or a 
wrecked vehicle can be purchased for salvage and the Vehicle Identifica-
tion Numbers (VIN) of the wrecked vehicle and a similar stolen model can 
be switched. The stolen automobile with its new legitimate VIN i
s then sold f
or profit, while the wrecked hulk is abandoned after substituting th
e stolen 
vehicle's VIN for its original VIN (CLEU Policy Analysi s, 1995B). 
    Fraud and counterfeiting opportunities continue to be seized by 
crimi-
nal entrepreneurs. New telecommunications , computer, and other technolo-
gies have created many new opportunities for such illegal activities . The C
riminal Intelligence Service Canada (1996A) reports that in 1994 C
ana-di
an banks lost an estimated C$143 million through fraud
, while the insur-
ance industry reckons that it loses C$1 .5 to $2 billion a year from various 
frauds. 
   CISC also reports an explosion of telecommunication and tele
phone toll fraud. Losses due to telecommunication theft and cloned cell ular tele-
phone operations are estimated by industry sources at approximately C$300 
million per year. Seizures of computer equipment , cloned phones, and soft-
ware to produce cloned phones have become commonplace in org
anized 
crime investigations. Cloned cellular phones are particularly attracti ve tar-
gets for criminals because, even more than inexpensive telephone access , th
ey offer anonymous and virtually untraceable communication s access. 
Commercially available scanners allow criminals to scan numbe rs from the 
airwaves and then use them to program cloned phones .
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   CISC also reports that organized crime groups are employing com-
puter criminals to gain access to telecommunications systems, data banks, 
credit profiles, and other personal information. Killam (1996) reports that 
high quality counterfeiting of currency, various types of bank and other 
credit or debit cards, and many other documents are very much a part of the 
activities of organized crime networks in Canada. Counterfeiting has be-
come much easier and more accessible because of various technological 
innovations such as sophisticated laser colour and ink-jet copiers or print-
ers. 
   Counterfeit documents are used to establish identities (by counterfeit 
birth or baptismal certificates), to obtain false passports, new driver's li-
censes, credit cards, and the like; or for those who have a need to establish 
a new identity, to confound creditors, law enforcement authorities, insur-
ance companies, or others. Such documents can also be used to establish 
multiple identities to defraud various government programs providing in-
come, social or health benefits. 
              4. The Composition of Organized 
               Criminal Groups 
    The Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (1996A) identifies outlaw 
motorcycle gangs and associations of criminals of various similar ethnic 
backgrounds to be the major visible organized groups of criminals within 
Canada. CISC observes that its association of organized criminal activity 
 with particular ethnic backgrounds is not meant to suggest that such activi-
 ties either are characteristic of people with such ethnic backgrounds or that 
 the governments or law enforcement agencies of the countries of origin 
 condone or participate in such illegal activities. Rather, such descriptions 
 simply refer to the fact that the majority of the members of specific orga-
 nized criminal clusters share an ethnic similarity. 
    CISC then identifies the major organized crime groups in Canada as 
 Asian (particularly Southeast Asian), Eastern European, Italian, Aborigi-
 nal, outlaw motorcycle gangs (particularly the Hell's Angels), and Columbian 
 in composition. Youth gangs, prison gangs, skinheads and militia-type 
 groups, among others, would be added to the CISC list by other observers, 
 such as Brodeur. 
     Asian groups operate mainly in Toronto and Vancouver, but also in 
Montreal, Calgary, Edmonton and, to a lesser extent, in Winnipeg, Ottawa 
 and Halifax. CISC reports that there is a preponderance of ethnic Asians at
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 every level of the Canadian heroin trade . Asian individuals and groups , 
 particularly those originating in the  People's Republic of China (PRC) , are 
 responsible for an estimated 80% of large scale heroin shipments into Canada 
 according to CISC (1996A) . Vietnamese street gangs and some triad mem -
 bers and their associates are also involved . Additionally, criminal organiza-
 tions based in the Asian community are becoming involved in multi-kilo-
 gram amounts of cocaine smuggling and trafficking . 
    The activities of criminal organizations based in the Asian communi -
 ties extend beyond those communities to include white collar crimes lik
e 
 money laundering, counterfeit cheque schemes , telephone toll and credit 
 card fraud. Asian groups , particularly one with roots in the PRC and known 
 as "Big Circle Boys" (BCB) , are thought to be responsible for most coun-
terfeit credit cards, and there are indications that they are distributing coun-
terfeit currency. They are also involved in major theft rings and com
mercial b
reak and enter. 
    CISC (I 996A) reports that a well organized criminal group operating 
in Toronto's Vietnamese community has staged auto accidents througho ut 
the province. This group also continues to be active in the contraband to-
bacco trade, specializing primarily in smuggling American -origin cigarettes . Vi
etnamese groups including both males and females have been involved 
in large scale shoplifting in many centres . 
    Of particular concern to law enforcement personnel is the frequent 
tendency of ethnic Asian criminal groups to develop alliances with legiti-
mate business, such as import companies , to facilitate their activities. By 
doing so, they recruit and involve other individuals who previously wer e 
without criminal backgrounds . They have also established links with the 
Hell's Angels, and with other clusters of organized criminals with origins 
in the Italian, Iranian, Nigerian , Lebanese, and Aboriginal communities . 
   Perhaps more alarming to the public is that much of the increase in 
violent criminal activity is attributed to these gangs that exploit othe rs in 
their own Asian communities . They are quite mobile and quick in resorting 
to violence, and are frequently armed with semi - or fully automatic weap -
ons. Typical Asian-gang signature crimes are extortion , loansharking, wit-
ness intimidation, illegal gambling , prostitution, drive-by shootings, home 
invasions, and commercial robberies . 
   CISC (1996A) reports that organized criminal activities linked to groups 
with east-European heritage are concentrated in the Toronto metropolit
an 
area, but appear to be spreading to Montreal and Vancouver . Of particular
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concern is the penetration of organized crime groups from the former So-
viet Union (FSU) into Toronto's FSU community. These groups have links 
with FSU-based criminal organizations operating in Russia, as well as 
throughout Europe and the U.S.A. There is also an escalating linkage be-
tween FSU organized criminal groups and entrepreneurial class criminals 
from the FSU who are associated with large international trading compa-
nies that move significant amounts of money into and out of the FSU. Orga-
nized criminal groups of predominantly east European membership report-
edly engage in a potpourri of criminal activities ranging from extortion, 
murder, and large scale theft to money laundering, international frauds, and 
the smuggling of drugs, cigarettes, weapons or automobiles. 
   Beare (1996) suggests that the Italian Mafia initially spread up from 
the United States to the city of Montreal rather than Toronto because of its 
geographical proximity, preexisting political corruption (in the province of 
Quebec) during the Duplessis regime, and the mystique of a Paris-like 
underlife. According to CISC (1996A), the preferred activities of ethnic 
Italian organized crime groups are drug trafficking, money laundering, gam-
bling, smuggling, and extortion, either alone or in association with other 
criminal groups. 
    The Italian Mafia also engage in other illegal activities as opportuni-
ties arise. Italian criminal groups are attracted to legitimate gaming venues 
such as casinos. These enterprises provide them with opportunities for money 
laundering, loansharking, prostitution, and other traditional types of orga-
nized criminal activities. Increasingly, Italian organized crime members and 
their associates are entering the legitimate business world. This provides 
them with good cover for meetings, as well as for money laundering and 
 smuggling activities. It also concerns law enforcement authorities that the 
 unfair competitive advantages of crime-funded businesses may overwhelm 
 legitimate businesses in the marketplace. 
    CISC (1996A) reports that there are about 35 outlaw motorcycle gangs, 
 with 70 chapters and about 1,200 members, in Canada. With 12 gangs, the 
 province of Ontario has the largest number of members. However, the most 
 powerful and best organized of these "biker" gangs are the Hell's Angels. 
 The Hell's Angels have 11 chapters, of which 5 are in each of the provinces 
 of Quebec and British Columbia; the other is in the province of Nova Scotia. 
    Some other gangs are closely connected with the Hell's Angels, in-
 cluding all three of the other biker gangs in the province of British Colum-
 bia. The British Columbia Hell's Angels are regarded as one of the wealthi-
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 est outlaw motorcycle gangs in the world . CISC (1996A) states that one of 
 the  Quebec chapters, the Nomads , formed with experienced Hell's Angels 
 members in 1995, was founded specifically to expedite expansio n and con-
 trol of the Hell's Angels' drug trafficking networks across Canada . 
    It is anticipated that the Hell's Angels are about to establish a cha
pter  in the province of Ontario . It is believed that this will ignite a major turf war 
 in that province . Beginning in July , 1995, within the province of Quebec 
 there has been a fierce ongoing conflict pitting the Montreal and Trois 
Rivieres chapters of the Hell's Angels against another gang called th
e Rock  M
achine. As of mid-1996 , this conflict has involved 86 violent incidents 
 and resulted in 26 deaths . One of the deaths was that of a child who was a 
 bystander to an explosion . 
    With the support of other motorcycle gangs across the co untry, the 
Hell's Angels are increasing their control of the importation
, distribution, 
and sale of illicit drugs such as cocaine , cannabis, methamphetamine, PCP 
and LSD. Hell's Angels also appear to be increasing their invol vement in 
the contraband alcohol and tobacco trade . 
    CISC (I 996A) reports that organized aboriginal criminal activiti es 
primarily involve contraband smuggling of liquor , tobacco and firearms. In 
addition, there is some smuggling of illegal migrants between the United 
States and Canada, particularly in eastern Canada , through reserves whose 
territories spill across the boundary into both countries . In Western Canada , 
aboriginal street gangs are establishing footholds in prostitution
, drugs, and 
crimes against the person . Such gangs frequently have strong connections 
with the aboriginal prison population from which they recruit members. 
There is a growing tendency for legitimate aboriginal leadership to seek to 
establish gaming venues (open to all people) on their reserves . This may 
attract various organized criminal groups seeking to infiltrate and devel op li
nks with the legitimate leadership of aboriginal reserves . 
   CISC (1996A) reports that very sophisticated Columbian drug traf -
ficking organizations continue to play a major role both in the Canadian 
cocaine trade and in multi-million dollar money laundering operations . They 
are very difficult to detect because they establish legitimate enterprises 
as 
commercial cover and blend into existing Latin American business com -
munities in cities like Toronto and Montreal . The Colombians also distance 
themselves as far as possible from trafficking and other physical proximity 
to the drug trade, including a separation of drug and money transaction
s. 
   It has become clear that the notion of all powerful cartels (e .g. the
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Medellin or Cali cartels) is not accurate. Rather, there appear to be a num-
ber of unique organizations, each of which has its own distinct head. For 
this reason, the Columbian cocaine traffic has been only minimally dis-
rupted by the imprisonment of the Cali Cartel leaders, or by the massive 5.4 
tonne seizure in 1994 from a cocaine mothership. Rather, the greatest threat 
to the Columbian cocaine monopoly arises from the incursion into the co-
caine trade of newer arrivals on the trafficking scene, such as Asian crimi-
nal groups, motorcycle gangs, Jamaican Posses, and FSU groups. 
            5. Resent Legislation to Combat 
             Organized CriminalL Activities 
   In 1988, the United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted the 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances. As CLEU Policy Analysis (1995A) reports, this 
Convention recognized that the illicit drug trade generates large financial 
profits and wealth enabling transnational alliances of criminals to penetrate, 
contaminate and corrupt structures of government, business, and society at 
all levels. It also identified the seizure of criminal assets as an effective way 
of fighting narcotics trafficking. 
    The Convention requires signatory states to enact legislation to autho-
rize the seizure and confiscation of proceeds, property and instrumentali-
ties of drug trafficking, and to make money laundering an offence. It also 
 suggests, where possible, a reversal of the usual onus of proof so that a 
criminal would have to prove that his or her assets and property are not 
 derived from the illicit drug traffic. To date, at least one hundred and six 
 states, including Canada, have adopted the Convention. Canada was one of 
 the 20 countries that ratified the Convention, allowing it to come into force 
 November 11, 1990 (Beare, 1996: 147). 
    Before the Convention was officially ratified, Canada already had 
 adopted a tripartite policy approach of targeting upwards, seizing proceeds, 
 and facilitating international enforcement. In 1988, Canada enacted Bill C-
 158, known as the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (S.C. 
 1988, c. 37). As of July, 1995 Canada had 12 treaties in force under this 
 legislation, and had signed 4 more that were not yet in force. Types of assis-
 tance specified in these treaties included executing searches and seizures, 
 taking evidence from witnesses, gathering and transferring information and 
 evidence, and making people available to participate in investigations (Beare, 
 1996).
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    In 1988 Canada also enacted Bill C-61 , commonly known as the Pro-
 ceeds of Crime Legislation (R.S.C. 1985, C. 42 [4th  Supp .]). This Act, which 
 came into force in 1989, created a new section (462 .3) of the Criminal Code 
 and amended the Narcotics Control Act (NCA) , the Food and Drug Act 
 (FDA), and the Income Tax Act. The amendment to the Income Tax Act 
 frees from criminal or civil liability individuals who disclose to peace offic -
ers that money or property is "proceeds of crime" , subject to s. 241 of the 
 Income Tax Act. 
    This legislation also created two categories of offences (enterprise crime 
offence and designated drug offence) , and makes it an offence to launder 
proceeds from either of them. Moreover, it allows police to place a restrain-
ing order on assets believed to be proceeds of these offences , with forfei-
ture of the assets possible after the trial . If a defendant is convicted , the C
ourt can order the assets forfeited if the Crown can show a relationship 
between the criminal, one of the crimes listed in the statute , and the assets 
themselves. 
    It proved difficult to document the laundering of proceeds from crimi -
nal activity. Consequently , in 1991 Canada passed the Proceeds of Crime 
(money laundering) Act (S.C. 1991, c. 26). This Act and its associated Regu-
lations came into effect in 1993. The Act and its Regulations apply to enti-
ties covered by various Acts relating to banks , insurance companies, co-
operative credit associations , trust companies, loan Companies, securities 
dealers, and foreign currency exchanges , as well as to certain professions 
and other businesspeople who receive cash to be transferred to another per -
son. They are required to keep , for five years, a Large Cash Transaction 
Record for any cash transaction of $10 ,000 or more. (Beare, 1996; CLEU 
Policy Analysis, 1992B). 
   Subsequent to 1988, there have been additional amendments to the 
Criminal Code and to other Canadian legislation that refined and increased 
the scope of what originally was designated as an "enterprise crime of-
fence" or a "designated drug offence"; eased the burden of proof linking the 
proceeds of crime with the associated crime; strengthened the ability of law 
enforcement officials to prove money laundering; allowed association to or 
membership in organized crime to be grounds for not being allowed into 
Canada; and introduced an improved Witness Protection Act (S .C. 1996, c. 
15) that came into effect June 20, 1996. Additional changes are pending, 
and still others have been introduced in the House of Commons or have 
been suggested by the law enforcement community .
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   Currently, the essence of Canada's Proceeds of Crime legislation is 
found in Section 462.3 (and subsections thereof) of the Criminal Code. 
Definitions of "designated drug of  offence', 
"enterprise crime offence" , "judge", and "proceeds of crime" are included 
under the Interpretations of s. 462.3. 
As currently stated, "designated drug offence"2 means: 
(a) an offence against section 39, 44.2, 44.3, 48, 50.2 or 50.3 of the Food 
and Drugs Act, 
(b) an offence against section 4, 5, 6, 19.1 or 19.2 of the Narcotic Control 
Act, or 
(c) a Conspiracy or an attempt to commit, being an accessory after the fact 
in relation to, or any counselling in relation to, an offence referred to in 
paragraph (a) or (b).3 
An "enterprise crime of fence"4 means 
(a) an offence against any of the following provisions, namely, 
(i) subsection 99(1) (weapons trafficking), 
(i.1) subsection 100(1) (possession for purpose of weapons trafficking), 
(i.2) subsection 102(1) (making automatic firearm),
 1. Bill C-8 (the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act [S.C., 1996, c.i5]), which has 
been passed by Parliament and received Royal Assent on June 20, 1996, when pro-
claimed by order of the Governor in Council, will rename "designated drug offence" as 
"designated substance offence ," and extend the coverage of this offence to include 
analogues and precursor chemicals. Bill C-8 fulfils Canada's obligations under the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and por-
tions of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances. As of November 15, 1996, the Controlled Drugs and Sub-
stances Act is not yet in force. 
  2. Although it has received Royal Assent, the Controlled Drug and Substances Act 
(1996 S.C., c. 15) has not yet been proclaimed by the Governor in Council. When 
proclaimed, the Act will modify 5.462.3 of the Criminal Code. Specifically, s. 68(1) of 
the legislation will repeal the offence of "designated drug offence," while s. 68(2) will 
create the offence of "designated substance offence". When proclaimed, this section is 
expected to read as follows: 
  "designated substance offence" means 
  (a) an offence under Part I of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, except sub-
section 4(1) of that Act, or
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(i.3) subsection 103(1) (importing or exporting knowing it is unauthorized) , 
(i.4) subsection 104(1) (unauthorized importing or exporting) , 
 (i.5) section 119 (bribery of judicial officers, etc.), 
(ii) section 120 (bribery of officers), 
(iii) section 121 (frauds upon the government), 
(iv) section 122 (breach of trust by public officer), 
(v) section 163 (corrupting morals), 
(v.1) section 163.1 (child pornography), 
(vi) subsection 201(1) (keeping gaming or betting house) , 
(vii) section 202 (betting, pool-selling, book-making, etc .), 
(viii) section 210 (keeping common bawdy-house) , y 
(ix) section 212 (procuring), 
(x) section 235 (punishment for murder), 
(xi) section 334 (punishment for theft), 
(xii) section 344 (punishment for robbery), 
(xiii) section 346 (extortion), 
(xiii.l) section 347 (criminal interest rate), 
(xiv) section 367 (punishment for forgery), 
(xv) section 368 (uttering forged documents), 
(xvi) section 380 (fraud), 
(xvii) section 382 (fraudulent manipulation of stock exchange transactions) , 
(xviii) section 426 (secret commissions), 
(xix) section 433 (arson), 
(xx) section 449 (making counterfeit money), 
(xxi) section 450 (possession, etc. of Counterfeit money) ,
  (b) a Conspiracy or an attempt to commit, being an accessory after the fact in rela-
tion to, or any counselling in relation to, an offence referred to in paragraph (a) . 
  3. The Criminal Code provides the meaning of counselling in s. 22, the meaning of 
an accessory after the offence in s. 23, and the scope of what is considered an "attempt" 
in s. 24. 
 4. The law is defined with reference to the specific sections of the Criminal Code 
cited. The parenthetical references are merely descriptive , for convenience, of the fo-
cus of the sections that define enterprise crime . Paragraph a(i) was replaced 1995 , c. 
39, s. 151(1) by subparagraphs (i) to 1(5) (to come into force by order of the Governor 
in Council). While not yet in force as of November 15, 1996, the amendments created 
by the Firearms Act are included herein as enacted by Parliament . The current i(5) is 
the same as the former a(i).
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(xxii) section 452 (uttering, etc. of counterfeit money), or 
(xxiii) section 462.31 (laundering proceeds of crime), 
(b)an offence against subsection 96(1) (possession of weapon obtained by 
commission of offence) ors section 354 (possession of property obtained by 
crime), committed in relation to any property, thing or proceeds obtained or 
derived directly or indirectly as a result of 
(i) the commission in Canada of an offence referred to in paragraph (a) or a 
designated substance' offence, or 
(ii) an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would 
have constituted an offence referred to in paragraph (a) or a designated 
substance offence, 
(b.1) an offence against section 126.1 or 126.2 or subsection 233(1) or 240(1) 
of the Excise Act or section 153, 159, 163.1 or 163.2 of the Customs Act, or 
(c) a conspiracy or an attempt to commit, being an accessory after the fact 
in relation to, or any counselling in relation to, an offence referred to in 
paragraph (a), (b), or (b.1) 
"Proceeds of crime" means any property , benefit or advantage, within or 
outside Canada, obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of: 
(a) the commission in Canada of an enterprise crime offence or a desig-
nated substance offence, or 
(b) an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would 
have constituted an enterprise crime offence or a designated substance of-
fence, or R.S.C. 1985, c. 42 (4th Supp), s. 2; 1993, c. 25; 1993, c. 37, s. 32; 
1993, c. 46, s. 5; 1994, c. 44, s. 29. 
    Section 462.31 of the Criminal Code defines the offence of Launder-
ing Proceeds of Crime. Specifically:
 5. The italicized section of paragraph (b) was amended by Parliament by the Fire-
arms Act in 1995 { c. 39, s. 151(2) } but is not yet in force. 
 6. Paragraph b(i) and b(ii) were amended by Parliament in 1996, Bill C-8, s. 70(a) 
but were not yet in force as of November 15, 1996. When these sections of Bill C-8 are 
proclaimed by order of the Governor in Council, it is expected that the term "desig-
nated drug offence" will be changed to "designated substance offence" as a result of 
Bill C-8 (Controlled Drugs and Substances Act) passed by Parliament but not yet in 
force. 
  7. Because of the impending change of "designated drug offence" to "designated 
substance offence", designated substance offence is used hereafter.
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(1) Every one commits an offence who uses, transfers the possession of , 
sends or delivers to any person or place , transports, transmits, alters, dis-
poses of, or otherwise deals with, in any manner and by any means , any 
property or any proceeds of property with intent to  conceaI or convert that 
property or those proceeds and knowing or believing' that all or a part of 
that property or of those proceeds was obtained directly or indirectly as a 
result of 
(a) the commission in Canada of an enterprise crime offence or a desig-
nated substance offence; or 
(b) an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada , would 
have constituted an enterprise crime offence or a designated substance of-
fence. 
    If there has been a conviction for an enterprise crime offence or a des -
ignated substance offence, when a judge determines on a balance of prob -
abilities that property is proceeds of crime and the offence was committed 
in relation to that property, the judge can order forfeiture . Alternatively, if 
the evidence does not establish a link between the offence and the property , 
the judge can still order forfeiture when convinced beyond reasonable doubt 
that the property is proceeds of crime . 
    In situations where the court is unable to order forfeiture because the 
proceeds have dissipated, left the country, or become irreversibly entwined 
with other property, the court has the power under s. 462.37(3) and (4) to 
impose a fine equal to the value of the proceeds . For default (nonpayment) 
imprisonment of increased duration as the value of default increases is to 
run consecutively with any other prison sentence . Already executed trans-
fers of proceeds of crime property can be voided by a judge under s. 462.4. 
   Sections 462.32 through 462.36, and subsections thereof , are concerned 
with Search, Seizure and Detention of Proceeds of Crime . Provision is 
made for special warrants, but such warrants must be brought to a senior 
judge, in writing, by an Attorney General, who is required to give such 
undertakings as the judge considers appropriate with respect to the pay-
ment of damages or costs, or both , in relation to the issuance and execution 
of the warrant. 
   Prior to the recent Proceeds of Crime legislation , Beare (1996) writes
S. The words, "or believing" are proposed to be added by Bill C-17 , s. 28, which has 
passed second reading in the House of Commons, but has not yet been passed by the 
full House as of November 15, 1996.
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that the s. 487 search warrant was the main provision allowing police to 
search premises involving criminal investigations. However, Proceeds of 
Crime cases require the police to gain information from third party loca-
tions like banks and other organizations. The new s. 462.32 search warrant 
is designed to allow the police to search for and then seize or restrain prop-
erty that may eventually be forfeited as proceeds of crime. 
   The Criminal Code (s. 462.33) has also been modified by Bill C-123, 
the Seized Property Management Act (S.C. 1993, c. 37) to provide for the 
planning, managing and oversight of seized property, and for its disposal 
when forfeiture is ordered. This Act came into force on September 1, 1993; 
its associated Forfeited Property Sharing Regulations came into force Janu-
ary 31, 1995. Funds received, net of disbursements, are to be shared with 
other governments, including foreign governments, but are not to be shared 
directly with police departments. 
   As has been noted above, under the new 5. 462.47 of the Criminal 
Code, and subject to 5. 241 of the Income Tax Act, a person, free of liabil-
ity, may disclose to a peace officer or to the Attorney General any reason-
able suspicion that a property is proceeds of crime or that a person has 
committed or is about to commit either an enterprise crime offence or a 
designated substance offence. 
    Furthermore, under s. 462.48 an Attorney General, or his/her desig-
nate, may make application to a judge to order the Deputy Minister of Na-
tional Revenue for Taxation (or his/her designate) to allow a police officer 
to examine or remove specified information and documents in "designated 
substance offence" cases. 
    There have, however, been police complaints about perceived weak-
nesses of these special s. 462.32 warrants because: they require an Attorney 
General to sign an undertaking accepting liability; they can only be autho-
rized by senior judges; the paperwork is excessive; the special warrants are 
not recognized interprovincially, and the special warrants are required to be 
renewed every six months under s. 462.35. 
         6. Judicial Decisions and Legislative Response 
    Beare (1996: 178ff) discusses several important recent court decisions 
that have restricted police practices, particularly in the areas of electronic 
 surveillance' and traditional "ownership" of the voluminous documents and 
evidentiary materials arising, in part, from undercover work.10 While dis-
closure by the Crown to permit the accused to make full answer and de-
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fence has always been present , as Asselin (1996) notes providing full dis-
closure is very costly in diverting resources of time and staff from investi -
gations." Concern has also been expressed about having to dismiss or plea 
bargain charges to avoid disclosures that would identify informants , under-
cover peace officers, or ongoing investigations and investigative techniques . 
   Prior to 1990, Canadian law allowed the police to use electronic means
to intercept communications, provided that one party to the Conversation 
consented to the interception. Such interceptions had been commonplace in 
undercover investigations in which police wore bodypacks that permitted 
electronic transmittal of their Conversations , in part for protection of their 
person. In 1990, the Supreme Court of  Canada'2 ruled that interceptions by 
consent of one party to a Conversation were no more acceptable than com-
pletely surreptitious interceptions, because in either Case an unwitting per-
son was being subjected to state eavesdropping at the sole discretion of 
agents of the state. The Court wrote that in a free society the threat that such 
consent interceptions would pose to privacy is wholly unacceptable . There-
after, such interceptions required prior judicial authorization to be admis -
sible as evidence. 
   In the same year, another decision interpreted video surveillance as a 
search, for which prior judicial authorization is required13. Two years later 
the interpretation of a search was extended to include the placing by police
  9. Deemed to be in violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , which 
specifies (s. 8): Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure. 
  10. Deemed to be in violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , 
which specifies (s. 7): Everyone has the right to life , liberty and security of the person 
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. 
 11. Asselin (1996) proposes charging the defence for the cost incurred to supply 
such documents to the defence, with exceptions being made for accused represented by 
Legal Aid. 
 12. R. V. Duarte [ 1990, 53 C .C.C. (3rd) 1, 74 C.R. (3d) 281, [1990] S .C.R. 30. 
 13. R. V. Wong 1990, 60 G.C.C. (3rd) 460 , [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, 1, C.R. (4th).
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of a tracking device inside a car14. According to Beare (1996), these deci-
sions were particularly problematic to the police for two reasons. First, the 
Criminal Code of Canada provided no mechanism for the police to obtain 
authorization to use some of the newer technologies such as beepers and 
video surveillance. The other was that some of the targets were highly placed 
lawyers, government officials, and wealthy businesspeople. Beare 
(1996:180) adds that some, perhaps unwarranted, Concern was expressed 
that the lawyers assisting the police in the warrant requests might discour-
age the police from targeting one of their colleagues. 
   Problems raised by the preceding concerns were mitigated by Bill C-
109, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, the Crown Liability and Pro-
ceedings Act, and the Radio Communications Act (S.C., 1993, c. 40), which 
came into force in August, 1993. This Act amended s.184 (and subsections 
thereof) of the Criminal Code to extend the means of acceptable intercep-
tion technologies to include "any electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or 
other device". Section 184.5 of the Criminal Code was also amended to 
explicitly extend the legislation to include radio-based telephone Commu-
nication. 
    The Act (S.C., 1993, c. 40) allows an agent of the state15 to engage in 
such interceptions if either the originator or the intended recipient of the 
private communication Consents to the interception, the agent of the state 
believes on reasonable grounds that there is a risk of bodily harm to the 
person who consented to the interception, and the purpose of the intercep-
tion is to prevent the bodily harm. Following the interception, the contents 
of the interception must be destroyed and are inadmissible as evidence, ex-
cept for the purpose of proceedings in which actual, attempted or threat-
ened bodily harm is alleged (CC, s. 184.1). 
    The Act (S.C., 1993, c. 40) makes permissible interception, with the 
consent of one party to the communication, if there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that information Concerning an offence will be found. Additional 
amendments to the Criminal Code now make it possible both to obtain
 14. R.V. Wise [ 1992, 70 C.C.C. (3rd) (S.C.C.). 
 15. "Agent of the state" is the term used in the legislation for a peace officer or for a 
person acting under the authority of, or in cooperation with, a peace officer.
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elewarrants for interceptions  (s.187.3) and to engage in interception with-
out prior judicial authorization if there are reasonable grounds that urgency 
precludes obtaining an authorization and is immediately necessary to pre-
vent an unlawful act that would cause serious harm to any person or to 
property, and there is consent to the interception by either the originator or 
the intended recipient of the communication (s.184.4). 
    This Act (S.C., 1993, c. 40) also amended the Criminal Code (s. 187.4) 
to allow a prosecutor to delete any part of a disclosure that the prosecutor 
believes would compromise the identity of a confidential informant , com-
promise the nature and extent of an ongoing investigation, endanger per-
sons engaged in particular intelligence-gathering techniques and thereby 
prejudice future investigations in which similar techniques would be used , 
or prejudice the interests of innocent persons . Of course, it also provides for 
the accused to petition the judge for disclosure of deletions . 
   Additionally, the Act (S .C., 1993, c. 40) modified Criminal Code pro-
visions concerning search warrants to take account of newer technologies . 
A new section (487.01) permits the use of "any device or investigative tech -
nique or procedure or do anything described in the warrant" that would , if 
not authorized, constitute an unreasonable search and seizure in respect to a 
person's property, if reasonable grounds exist that an offence against an 
Act of Parliament is being committed and information will be obtained about 
such an act. However, a further subsection explicitly qualifies this section 
as not permitting interference with the bodily integrity of any person . 
   Other amendments made by the Act to the Criminal Code allow a track-
ing device to be used for a period of sixty days (s . 492.2), and allow the 
installation and monitoring of a number recorder to record telephone num -
bers to which or from which communications are made (s . 492.1). 
   Two other important cases were R. v. Stinchcombe" and R. v . 
Denbigh". In Stinchcombe, the Court ruled that the Crown must make full 
disclosure to the defence of anything that might assist the accused , even if 
the Crown does not propose to adduce such information . Such disclosure is 
tempered by some reviewable discretion on the part of the Crown subject to 
privilege, protection of informants, not to impede an ongoing investigation, 
and the like. In Denbigh, Beare (1996) suggests that the judge seems to
16. [1991]  3 S.C.R., 326, 9 C .R. (4th) 277, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1, [1992j 1 W .W.R. 97. 
17. 1990, 4 C.R.R. (2nd) 141.
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 imply  a  model  that  would  see  the  police  as disinterested accumulators of 
facts rather than as interested parties who have a commitment to appre-
hending guilty parties and (lawfully and ethically) assisting in seeing that 
they are found guilty in court. 
   For Beare (1996: 182) the major issue appears to be who "owns" the 
massive evidence assembled by the police for the Crown. For the judiciary, 
the answer appeared rather clearly to be "the public", including the accused. 
However, others [e.g. Asselin (1996) and CISC (1996C)1, see the issue as 
one of huge and unwarranted expense and diversion of scarce staff resources 
for fishing expeditions that in various ways will impede investigations, pros-
ecutions, and convictions of guilty parties. 
                  7. Pending Legislation 
   Two important pieces of legislation are pending. One of these is Bill 
C-8, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, which received Royal As-
sent on June 20, 1996 and will come into force by order of the Governor in 
Council. This Act will consolidate Canada's drug control policy to fulfil its 
international obligations. It will repeal and replace the Narcotics Control 
Act and Parts III and IV of the Food and Drug Act. 
    This legislation will also replace "designated drug offence" under s. 
462.3 of the Criminal Code with "designated substance offence." The latter 
will include analogues (substances chemically similar to those designated), 
and precursor chemicals. As was true for the Narcotic Control Act [s. 4(1)1, 
"substance" includes "or in any substance represented or held out by that 
person to be a substance" as defined [Bill C-8, s. 5(1)]. 
    Section 11 of Bill C-8 allows peace officers to submit information for 
search warrants by telephone or other telecommunications, and also pro-
vides for warrantless searches and seizures for exigent circumstances or in 
other circumstances where it would be impractical to obtain one. 
    Bill C-8 (under s. 10 and subsections thereof), specifies as aggravating 
circumstances in sentencing: trafficking when one carried or threatened to 
use a weapon; trafficking associated with threatened or actual violence; 
possession for trafficking in or near a school or school grounds; possession 
for trafficking in or near any other public place usually frequented by per-
 sons under the age. of 18; sale to those under the age of 18; when the ac-
 cused has previously been convicted of trafficking; or when the accused 
 has used a person under the age of 18 to assist in trafficking. At sentencing, 
 if an aggravating circumstance is present, a judge must provide reasons if
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 the accused is not imprisoned . 
    The other important pending piece of legislation is Bill  C-17 , the Crimi-
 nal Code Improvement Act , 1996,  which passed second reading in the House 
 of Commons on June 11, 1996. One focus of this bill is Counterfeiting .  C
riminal Intelligence Service Canada (1996A) believes that by deali
ng with 
 possession of counterfeit credit cards, misuse of account information , mis-
 use of equipment to make counterfeit credit cards , and misuse of passwords, 
 Bill C-17 will have an impact on enforcement efforts by thus making the 
 prosecution of counterfeit credit card activities easier . 
    However, other provisions of the bill may be more far -reaching . Sec-
 tions 28(2) and 28(3) of the proposed legislation will explicitly 
provide 
 peace officers (and, in certain circumstances, convicted criminals working 
 under the supervision of and assisting the peace officer) with im
munity for 
criminal acts "if done for the purpose of an investigation or otherwi se in the 
execution of the peace officer's duties" pursuant to the investigation of crimi-
nals who receive or conceal proceeds of crime [through the additi
on of 
s.462.31(3) to the Criminal Code] . 
    If enacted and proclaimed , peace officers operating under this bill will 
be granted immunity from prosecution , and the resulting evidence will be 
admissible in court . This contemplated legislation has the effect of accept -
ing a need for specialized enforcement techniques to deal with 
sophisti-
cated criminal activities , while ensuring that peace officers , and the agents 
of peace officers, employing such techniques will be doing so withi n the 
law. 
   Other provisions of this proposed bill , and the sections of the Criminal 
Code they will introduce or amend , will: make it easier to extend the reach 
of warrants interprovincially under Proceeds of Crime investigations [Crimi-
nal Code s. 462.32(1) and (2)1; enable authorization of search tele warrants 
(by adding Criminal Code 5.487.091 as proposed by s .45 of Bill C-171; 
facilitate-searching and gathering information from computers (Bill C-17; 
s. 41); make it lawful for police to conduct surveillance "by means of tele-
vision cameras or sundry electronic devices of activities in circumsta nces 
in which persons had reasonable expectations of privacy" unde r circum-
stances similar to the interception of private communications [Criminal C
ode (
s. 487.01(5) as proposed for amendment by s. 42 of Bill C-17]; allow night 
time execution of search warrants if approved by a judge (Criminal Code s. 488 
as proposed to be modified by s. 47 of Bill C-17); allow warrantless 
searches and seizures for exigency under Certain circumstances (Criminal
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Code s. 487.11 as proposed to be modified by s. 46 and s. 48 of Bill C-17); 
extend several of the sections (Criminal Code, ss. 183-196) concerned with 
the interception of private Communications to apply equally to observa-
tions made by peace officers (proposed to be modified by s. 42 of Bill C-
17), and make it also an offence for a person to believe that a person is 
laundering proceeds of crime in addition to knowingly laundering such pro-
ceeds (Criminal Code s. 462.31). 
           8. Additional Concerns of 
              the Law Enforcement Community 
   Canada's legislation against organized criminal activity is still unfold-
ing. Proposals for new or amended legislation to augment the struggle against 
collusive criminal activities continue to be advanced. Thus, following a 
"Forum on Organized Crime" in Canada's capital region on September 27-
28, 1996, Solicitor General Herb Gray and Minister of Justice and Attorney 
General Allan Rock reaffirmed Canada's intention to develop new mea-
sures to help Canadian law enforcement agencies fight. organized crime. 
Their joint press release identified the following as among the measures 
recommended to the Government by Forum participants: 
    • Legislative changes to allow police greater access to income tax 
      information for major criminal investigations and to expand the scope
      of enterprise crimes so that police can target more forms of criminal 
     profiteering; 
     • The introduction of mandatory suspicious transaction reporting by 
      financial institutions to facilitate police investigations into organized
      crime and in particular to prevent money laundering; 
     • The introduction of cross-border currency controls. This measure 
      would provide police and customs officers with the necessary tools 
      to investigate the movement of large sums of money across borders. 
     • New criminal intelligence arrangements, building on the Criminal 
      Intelligence Service Canada system. The new system will allow po-
      lice to make queries about activities of other police forces, helping
      co-operation and information exchange; and 
     • Establishment of national and regional co-ordinating committees to 
      support law enforcement action against organized crime. These com-
      mittees will help facilitate multi-agency operations and ensure that 
      public policy decisions by governments are sensitive to operational
       concerns and requirements.
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    The police community is particularly strong in its proposals to make 
 money laundering and currency transfers more difficult . Some proposed 
 means for doing so are: greater access to income tax information; manda -
 tory suspicious transaction reporting; crossborder currency and monetary
 instrument reporting and controls , and elimination of the $1,000 bill as a 
unit of currency. These changes would facilitate following the money to its 
ultimate recipient. They may also be effective in reducing the incentive to 
engage in enterprise or drug crime by making it more and more difficult to 
realize significant financial benefits from such activities (CLEU Policy 
Analysis, 1992B; Beare, 1996; Killam , 1996). 
    Currently, Canadian casinos and other gaming houses provide ready 
opportunities for money laundering . Beare (1996:126) suggests that these 
opportunities be made more difficult by bringing such facilities under man-
datory reporting requirements . She notes that for casinos in the United States , 
rules concerning cash transactions are extended to cash equivalents (chips
, 
tokens, front money deposits , cash bets, purchase of casino cheques, and 
exchanges of Currency). Casinos must keep records of customers who have 
purchased or redeemed slot machine tokens of more than $3,000 in a single 
gaming day; multiple cash transactions must be treated as a single transac-
tion if they are "by or on behalf of any person"; if a customer's cash in or 
cash out transactions, when aggregated , exceed $10,000 in a gaming day, 
the casino must obtain the identification of the customer if it is "reasonably 
available." 
   CLEU Policy Analysis  (1995A) has proposed that , in addition to Pro-
ceeds of Crime forfeiture and prosecution under the Income Tax Act , civil 
forfeiture be considered as a third option for taking the profit out of crime . 
CLEU believes that a provincial civil forfeiture statute could probably be 
Constitutionally enacted. They propose that such a statute should: limit pros -
ecutions of civil forfeiture actions to the Crown; restrict proceeds of crime 
and instruments of crime to such forfeiture; apply only to property associ -
ated with major crimes; require only a balance of probabilities proof; re -
quire the owner of the property to explain how the property was acquired 
under certain circumstances; have clauses to protect their party rights; and 
include appropriate provisions for pre-trial restraining orders to prevent the 
removal of the property from provincial jurisdiction before the courts rules 
on the forfeiture issue. 
   Asselin (1996) has suggested that there also be cost recovery for dis -
closure of evidence to the defence , and that those Convicted of enterprise or
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designated substance offences be required to pay investigative and trial costs 
associated with their offences Other suggestions include creation of the of-
fence of "misprision of felony" 8; new provisions relating to membership in 
criminal organizations (e.g. the Mafia or outlaw motorcycle gangs); and 
new provisions affecting sentencing, including harsher sentences to facili-
tate targeting upward by inducing lower level offenders to provide infor-
mation in return for sentencing considerations. 
   Asselin (1996) has proposed a Model Anti-Organized Crime Act which 
includes the following among its more extensive objectives: 
    • to make provision for obtaining a declaration to the effect that a 
     person is a member of a criminal organization; 
    • to facilitate the provisional Custody of a person indicted for an en-
     terprise crime offence or a designated drug offence and who is a 
     member of a criminal organization; 
    • to facilitate the seizure and forfeiture of proceeds of crime that be-
     long to a criminal organization or a member of a criminal organiza-
     tion; 
    • oblige the court at the time of sentencing to consider as an aggravat-
     ing factor the fact that the offence was committed by a member of a 
     criminal organization; 
    • to force a member of a criminal organization to establish the origin 
     of goods seized by virtue of the present law; 
    • to take away from a member of a criminal organization the advan-
      tages of release on parole, and 
     • to facilitate the deportation of a member of a criminal organization. 
              9. What has Canada been doing?
   A. Convictions. 
Canada' s evolving law in the area of enterprise crime and designated 
substance offences is so new that it is premature to judge its efficacy. There 
has been little jurisprudence involving Proceeds of Crime and related legis-
lation, and there have been few investigations that have been publicly dis-
closed as of this writing. Nevertheless, the police have been given very 
powerful tools that appear to be having a significant effect. 
   On August 31, 1994, for instance, the RCMP announced the comple-
 18. Misconduct or neglect of duty, especially by a public official, concealment of 
knowledge of a felony or of treason by a person other than the culprit.
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tion of a three part, four year undercover  operation 
   codenamed Operation Contrat/Compote/Creditor that had involved a 
collaborative working arrangement among the Columbian cartels, the tradi-
tional Italian Mafia, and the Hell's Angels. Over 200 banking accounts in 
29 banking institutions were frozen, including all the records and bank ac-
counts of 34 Companies. Three lawyers were arrested (Beare [ 1996: 93-
951). 
   Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (1996A) reports that this opera-
tion resulted in sentences of up to 15 years and asset forfeiture of up to 
C$4.5 million. The principal lawyer involved, Joseph Lagana, reputedly 
was the brains behind the criminal operation and was the only man in direct 
contact with alleged Montreal Mafia chieftain Vito Rizzuto. Lagana's sen-
tence of 13 years and asset seizure of C$2.7 million is being appealed by 
the Crown as too lenient. Lagana confessed to having laundered C$47.4 
million in drug proceeds and having participated in a conspiracy to import 
558 kilograms of cocaine. CISC (1996A) also reports the conclusion of 
another investigation in April, 1996 that resulted in the arrests of more than 
30 subjects in Quebec, Ontario and abroad. Among those arrested, ranging 
from baggage handlers to a brokerage firm executive, were several high 
profile crime targets.
  B. Integrated Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Drug Profiteering Units 
   The RCMP created Anti-Drug Profiteering (ADP) units attached to 
drug investigation sections across Canada in 1982 to use the criminal legis-
lation of the day, but Killam (1996) reports that these units were not very 
successful. As part of Canada's Drug Strategy, Killam continues, in 1992 
an initiative entitled Integrated Anti-Drug Profiteering (IADP) was funded 
in Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal. The intent of the units was to bring 
together an integrated system of enforcement personnel, including RCMP 
investigators, Justice Crown Counsel, forensic accountants, provincial and 
municipal police, and Revenue Canada investigators. 
   These IADP units, which essentially were an enhanced Joint Forces 
Operation and which were to be evaluated annually to measure their effec-
tiveness, received five year funding totalling C$33 million. These units have 
been judged to be so successful that the concept of integrated units is also 
being recommended for the thirteen operational Proceeds of Crime (POC) 
units. 
   Indirectly, the POC units had their origin after the offences of launder-
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ing or possessing the proceeds of tobacco and alcohol smuggled into Canada 
were created in 1993. The RCMP was granted additional resources related 
to The Anti-Smuggling Initiative announced in April, 1994. The intent of 
the initiative was increased RCMP customs and excise enforcement, and 
also the dismantling of criminal organizations by attacking the proceeds of 
their activity. As a result of this initiative, the RCMP merged resources 
previously diffused among anti-drug profiteering, enterprise crime, and pro-
ceeds of crime from smuggling, into Proceeds of Crime (POC) units. 
   Based upon the success of the Integrated Anti-Drug Profiteering (IADP) 
units and following a December, 1994 evaluation, the RCMP proposed that 
all 13 existing POC units across Canada be converted into Integrated Pro-
ceeds of Crime (IPOC) units. Killam adds that it has been recommended 
that the three existing IADP units in Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal also 
be converted into IPOC units and be continued past their planned expiry off 
December 31, 1997. 
   There are also other integrated units fighting crime. For example, CISC 
(1996A) relates that Toronto's Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit 
(CFSEU) and Combined Forces Asian Investigation Unit (CFAIU) have 
successfully investigated credit card fraud in the last several years.
   C. Community Collaboration 
   At the same time, Killam (1996) reports that the RCMP has only 204 
full time personnel involved in POC enforcement. For that reason, the RCMP 
has also taken other initiatives to thwart organized criminal activities. These 
have taken a variety of forms. 
   In 1992, Killam (1996) relates that the RCMP entered into a voluntary 
agreement with the Canadian Bankers Association, whereby the banks agreed 
to disclose suspicious transactions to deter money laundering. A similar 
agreement was made with the Credit Union Central of Canada (CUCC) in 
January, 1996. Negotiations for parallel negotiations are ongoing with other 
financial institutions and agencies, such as the Canadian Health and Life 
Assurance Association. These voluntary agreements fill a lacuna because 
at this time Canadian law 'does not-require mandatory reporting of suspi-
cious transactions, but requires only that records be kept by the institutions. 
Killam (1996) recounts that the RCMP has formed strategic partner-
ships with various interests such as the banking and telecommunications 
industries, credit card manufacturers, and computer professionals to develop 
effective enforcement, educational and deterrence strategies, including lob-
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bying the Department of Justice for amendments to the Criminal Code of 
Canada. Additionally, the RCMP are engaged in a number of other initia-
tives, such as: distributing warning labels to the manufacturers of colour 
copier equipment to be affixed at the point of distribution to discourage 
"weekend" counterfeiters
; working with manufacturers of colour copiers to 
develop anti-counterfeiting technologies; developing educational initiatives 
for merchants, banks, and the general public about the recognition of coun-
terfeit currency and credit cards, and producing a "Technological Crime 
Bulletin" that is distributed to Canadian police agencies and to outside agen-
cies sharing a legitimate interest in law enforcement. The RCMP is also 
considering the introduction of a computer ethics program in schools and 
the use of the Internet to post crime prevention messages related to techno-
logical crime. 
   On a slightly different tack, the Solicitor General Canada has provided 
funding to Osgoode Hall Law School to establish a Research Centre on 
Organized Crime and Corrections. 
   In addition, many police departments have been seeking to 
   involve the community more in the fight against crime through vari-
ous community-based and problem-oriented policing initiatives. Such pub-
lic involvement is essential if the smuggling of drugs, other contraband, 
people, and illicit transfers of dirty money are to be contained. Canada has 
tens of thousands of kilometres of borders, largely undefended and un-
guarded. While most of these borders are rugged and sparsely populated on 
three oceans, there are also 8,893 kilometres of common border with the 
United States, including 2,477 kilometres of extremely rugged terrain bor-
dering Alaska. Such a situation makes Canada a very attractive staging point 
for the smuggling of money, people, drugs and other contraband into and 
out of the United States. 
   Certainly the public should perceive that it has a stake in increasing its 
involvement in fighting criminal activities, particularly in the current pe-
riod of harsh fiscal realities. By way of illustration, in the province of Brit-
ish Columbia, CLEU (1992A) estimated the economic cost of illicit drug 
use for 1989 to be at least C$349 million (or roughly $100 per every.resident 
in the province). Put differently, this was approximately equal to the cost of 
highway maintenance across the entire province, or equivalent to the cost 
of educating more than 78,000 children for a year in British Columbia 
schools. 
   Most of  these costs were justice-related, including drug law enforce-
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ment services ($67.9M) and the policing of non-drug crimes, such as break 
and enter or crimes of violence, that were related to illicit drug use  ($151M). 
Drug related workplace accidents and reduced productivity due to drug re-
lated absenteeism was estimated at $48.3M, while the cost of injury claims 
(including innocent parties) for automobile accidents involving illicit drugs 
was estimated at $39M. 
   In contrast to these huge enforcement and third party costs, CLEU 
reckons that British Columbia taxpayers spent only $13.8M on provincial 
programs directed at the prevention of substance abuse, of which a minus-
cule $1.8M was directly targeted at the prevention of illicit drug use. Other 
costs included $20.6M for social assistance expenditures for drug users; 
$3.1M for health care programs involving methadone maintenance, AIDS, 
needle exchange, and partial cost of infants of substance abusing mothers; 
and $17M for federal contributions for treatment, federal and provincial 
treatment services, and employee assistance programs. 
                  10. Critical Questions
   Recent years have seen efforts at a radical transformation of Canadian 
law as it relates to profit-motivated substance crimes and an eclectic array 
of what are defined as enterprise crimes. This transformation has been far-
reaching and includes provisions relating to search, seizure, interception of 
communications, surreptitious observation, and immunity of police from 
prosecution for crimes they engage in or direct others (who have been au-
thorized by a judge to be under their supervision) to engage in during the 
course of an investigation into the large and increasing array of offences 
included as enterprise crimes or dangerous substance of fences. 
   Most Canadians probably will be pleased to see the increasing success 
of police in gaining convictions against major substance criminals and to 
see "loopholes and technicalities" being closed in the detection, pursuit and 
conviction of a wide range of other criminals. 
   However, these recent developments raise several issues. One of these 
is that criminal entrepreneurs typically have thrived by providing goods or 
services for which there is a widespread demand, but which governments 
have either outlawed or limited. Another issue, as has been pointed out by 
CISC (1996A), Beare (1996), Brodeur (1996) and Naylor (1996) alike, is 
that criminal entrepreneurs typically have a variety of mutually rewarding 
associations with what are considered legitimate companies and institutions. 
A third issue is whether organized crime is a rhetoric being used to mobi-
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lize public support for a hidden agenda. 
   Other than briefly noting these concerns, this is not the appropriate 
place or time to analyze them. Such a task would require a separate paper. 
Nevertheless, and despite the fact that this paper is already far too long, 
some brief points will be made.
Criminal entrepreneurs fulfil widespread demands. 
   Naylor (1996:54) succinctly summarizes the first issue by stating that 
"there has never been a black 
market in history that has been successfully 
tamed by a supply-side attack." Brodeur (1996) makes the same point in 
quoting Albanese and Pursley (1993:66) that: "There is a great deal of evi-
dence to suggest that organized crime will exist as long as there is a demand 
for goods and services that cannot be obtained legally." 
   Throughout most of this century, Canada has tried to reduce both the 
supply of and the demand for a variety of illegal goods and services. It gave 
up on prohibition. To oversimplify somewhat, it accepted prostitution pro-
vided the solicitation is not pressing. Recently, the extensive smuggling of 
alcohol and tobacco caused the Canadian government to reduce excise taxes 
on tobacco products in an attempt to shrink the market for smuggling Cana-
dian cigarettes sold for export back across the border into Canada. In addi-
tion to having implications for Canada's national health policy, govern-
ments were driven to forego $500 million per year in revenues as a result of 
excise tax reductions they felt constrained to make.
Criminals have much interaction with conventional members of soci-
ety in the course of providing them with illegal goods and services. 
   As has been noted, typically there are significant relationships between 
alliances of criminal entrepreneurs and what are commonly considered to 
be law abiding individuals, organizations, or companies. Brodeur (1996) 
notes, for example, that corporations are quite prepared to do business with 
questionable waste treatment companies, "no questions asked." When the 
traffic in Cigarette smuggling was exploding to evade high excise taxes, 
Canadian cigarette manufacturers experienced an increase in exports from 
222 million in June, 1990 to 2.235 billion by March, 1993. Did Canadian 
cigarette manufacturers believe that Americans had developed a craze for 
Canadian cigarettes? Or did they know that the exported cigarettes were 
being smuggled back into Canada to avoid excise taxes  —but didn't care, 
especially when they also know that cigarette consumption increases when
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the cost of purchasing cigarettes decreases? And have the bankers and oth-
ers who have been laundering dirty money been unaware of what they have 
been doing, or have they not cared so long as they were making a good 
profit? 
   Naylor (1996) asks a slightly different question: whether the real issue 
is organized crime taking over legitimate businesses, or whether it is legiti-
mate businesses using criminal means, and sometimes Contracting with 
criminals, to achieve profit targets. As examples, he cites the widespread 
insurance fraud of derelict buildings in the. 1970s and 1980s with bank 
cooperation; fly by night toxic waste companies that relieve polluters of 
liability before disappearing; and six large Anglo-American tobacco com-
panies that supplied Latin America.with most of its bootleg whisky and 
electronics, as well as cigarettes, by many of the same channels that have 
been reversed now for the export of cocaine.
Is the fight against "organized crime" at least partly a rhetoric? 
   Calavita and Pontell (1990) have reported that estimates of the costs to 
bail out insolvent savings and loan associations(S&L) begin at US$300 bil-
lion, and that government reports suggest that criminal activity was involved 
in 70 to 80% of these insolvencies. In those cases where prosecution oc-
curred, U.S. Attorneys complained that convicted criminals typically re-
ceived very lenient sentences, frequently probation —often without any 
restitution required. 
   Similarly, Kappeler et al. (1993) cite the Bank of Commerce and Credit 
International (BCCI), then the world's seventh largest private financial in-
stitution, as a good example of the cosy relationship that may arise among 
drug traffickers, white Collar criminals, the intelligence Community, and 
leading Politicians from both parties in the United States. BCCI was in the 
truest sense a "full service bank" laundering millions of dollars for the Co-
lombia cocaine cartels, helping Marcos transfer money out of Philippines, 
and acting as a conduit for CIA funds destined for the Contras to support 
illegal arms deals and Contra-backed Cocaine trafficking. 
   BCCI also had powerful political allies. These included Clark Clifford 
(former Secretary of Defense and adviser to four presidents); Edwin Meese 
(Reagan's Attorney General), and Black, Manafort and Stone (the advertis-
ing consultants to the Republican Party). Moreover, it had political connec-
tions with Senator D'Amato and Presidents Carter and Bush. Perhaps it is 
unsurprising that the Justice Department appeared disinterested in begin-
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 ning an investigation into BCCI's affairs. 
   In contrast to the mild response to the mind-boggling magnitude of the 
S&L looting, as far back as 1981, Anderson and Wynn (1981) were criticiz-
ing U.S. authorities for politically motivated use of RICO legislation to 
target a variety of groups, as well as "enterprises" as diverse as the Macon 
(Georgia) Police Department, a General Motors factory, a nightclub, and a 
pool hall, among others. 
   More generally, the role of the United States government in the drug 
trade needs to be assessed. Its involvement is not a new revelation. As 
Kappeler et al (1993: 235-250) document, United States Government in-
volvement with the warlords in Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle goes back 
to the 1960s. Such involvement included using Air America, a CIA front, 
for the transport of drugs, and banks such as the Nugen Hand Bank in Aus-
tralia and the Castle Bank in Florida for laundering drug money.
Beare (1996:69) makes a similar observation in writing that: 
Any Objective discussion of organized crime in South America must 
at least acknowledge the culpability of the CIA and other U.S. govern-
ment officials who advance foreign policies at the expense of drug 
enforcement. According to Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and In-
ternational Operations, the Congressional hearings into the Contra drugs 
and arms scandal showed that stopping drug trafficking to the United 
States has been a secondary U.S. foreign policy objective. It has been 
sacrificed repeatedly for other political goals.
   In short, throughout this century, how serious has the United States 
been about its wars on drugs and on organized crime? Has its original 1970 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and its sub-
sequent use of the United Nations and UN bodies to enlist other countries in 
the wars against drugs and "organized crime", been genuine? Or has there 
been a hidden agenda? 
   If the concern were merely to dry up criminal organizations' profits 
from the sale of illicit drugs, a public health approach to drug users would 
probably be at least as effective and certainly much less expensive. How-
ever, early on Anderson and Wynn (1981) noted that the U.S. Government 
was using RICO to prosecute political groups as diverse as a Croatian na-
tionalist group, the Black Liberation Army, and the Weather Underground.
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   Naylor (1996: 50-51) summarizes arguments from a variety of sources 
that claim the new legislation, ostensibly directed against "organized crime": 
confuses criminal and civil matters; reverses the burden of proof so that the 
accused must establish the legitimacy of his or her assets, rather than the 
state prove their illegitimacy; erodes civil liberties; demonstrates a marked 
disparity between the severity of the laws and the abandon with which the 
offences are defined; and because of its vast and inclusive coverage, RICO, 
according to some observers, gives police in the United States the veritable 
right to loot. While "the right to loot" may be a provocative and needlessly 
inflammatory turn of phrase, Beare (1996:172) writes that.U.S. "jurisdic-
tions short of resources tend to build the `expectation' of seizures into the 
budget process."
Naylor (1996:50) observes: 
Furthermore, the proceeds-of-crime approach reflected particular 
American ideological and institutional conditions.. Just as RICO was 
strongly influenced by the prevailing concern over industrial concen-
tration, so too the and-money laundering mania occurred against a 
general background of fears about the deterioration of the American 
fiscal and financial situation. It was a time when the American interna-
tional payments position seemed to be weakening. This was compli-
cated by the budgetary situation. Rather than blaming capital outflows 
on giant corporations shifting production offshore in search for cheap 
and non-unionized labor, and rather than pointing out that the rich were 
"avoiding" their fair share of the tax burden through domestic shelters 
and offshore havens, public attention was focused on the drug barons, 
draining off capital and escaping the grasp of the tax collectors. Tighter 
regulations on international financial flows were supposed to help solve 
the first, and asset seizure could help rectify the inequities caused by 
the second.
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